Asian Cyberactivism - Freedom of Expression and Media Censorship Edited by Steven Gan, James Gomez and Uwe Johannen © Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the author, 2004 Part III : One Party States Chapter 7 The Internet in Vietnam: Party Propaganda or Infotainment? Robin van Koert Introduction: images of Vietnam Enthusiastic youngsters using e-mail, surfing the World Wide Web and 'chatting' on the Internet in more than 5,000 Internet cafés. This is not the image people generally have of Vietnam. The relatively low number of Internet subscribers, estimated at around 465,000 people (VNNIC June 2003) in a population of almost 80 million, probably adheres more to the idea which outsiders have of Vietnam, a country on the periphery of the network. However, the large number of Internet cafés and increasingly affordable Internet access rates1 means that the actual number of users is estimated to be higher than the number of dial-up subscribers. Still, in June 2003 only about 1.9 million people were estimated to be using the Internet, less than 2.5% of the population. Nevertheless, the Internet has offered the Vietnamese Diaspora opportunities for pro-democracy activities. However, in a crackdown on dissent in 2002, the Vietnamese authorities arrested a number of political dissidents for alleged involvement with groups in the Vietnamese Diaspora. In 2003, the crackdown continued with the arrest of well-known dissidents and harsh sentences passed on earlier arrested political dissidents. In the meantime, amongst other developments, on-line job recruitment arrived in November 2002, individual craftsmen in Hoi An have started selling their goods over the Internet and 2003 witnessed the launch of Vietnam's first on-line shop called 'Rong Thai Binh Duong', or the 'Pacific Dragon', the introduction of ADSL Internet services, telephony over the Internet, as well as mobile phone based multimedia messaging services. Far more significantly, the government has approved trials with Internet access through VSAT technology. This satellite technology bypasses the Internet gateways controlled and monitored by Vietnam Data Communication (VDC), the original Internet Access Provider (IXP). In 2003, two additional state-owned companies were awarded IXP licenses: VIETEL, operated by the Ministry of Defense, and the Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology (FPT), run by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment. Access to the Internet was provided by seven Internet Service Providers (ISPs), amongst which was a privately owned ISP: One-Connection Internet (OCI). Several more companies have been issued with ISP licenses. So far, the Internet certainly has had a positive economic impact. Still, images of an 'Internet revolution' may not immediately come to the minds of people unfamiliar with modern Vietnam. Most people are more likely to think of Vietnam in terms of three decades of war. The war, which followed Ho Chi Minh's Declaration of Independence, established the iconic impression of a small but heroic people fighting the odds in overcoming the power of the French and the military might of the US. This image of a resilient people and a unified nation under the inspiring leadership of the communists has been exploited by the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) and continues to be promoted as the true image of Vietnam and its people. With the conclusion of the war and the formal reunification of Vietnam in 1976, interest in Vietnam waned. Under the influence of Cold War propaganda, the stand-off between the US and the former Soviet Union and the many related local conflicts in the world, the image of Vietnam became even vaguer. Gradually, the images of the resilience of the Vietnamese gave way to stories about their abject poverty and the image of the exemplary, inspiring leadership of the VCP slowly changed into one of authoritarian rule. After the collapse of communism in Europe, Vietnam came to be perceived as one of the last real life examples of all that was wrong with the dogmatic application of a flawed ideology. Whatever images outsiders had of Vietnam in the 1990s, it was not likely to be of a country establishing a socialist economy based on 'Market-Leninism' (Templer 1999: 151, 292). Less likely still was the image of a country embarking on a road possibly leading to self-destruction, especially for a dogmatic leadership wary of free speech, i.e., a country entering the information age by connecting to the Internet. Nevertheless, that is what happened. After having allowed and supported Internet experiments since 1991, Vietnam linked to the Internet in December 1997. The significance of this development was discussed extensively by people longing to see a political change towards democracy. However, as I will elaborate in this chapter, the Internet's development in Vietnam so far suggests that, despite internal divisions, the party has succeeded in maintaining an economic focus on the Internet, rather than one highlighting its political potential. For a proper understanding of Vietnam, it is crucial to realize that already in 1991 the country was no longer a monolithic state. Nevertheless, the VCP was still a dominant factor; its factions had done their homework and their grasp of the politics of economics proved to be a formidable obstacle to developments towards democracy. In addition, the VCP had gradually acquired the ability to respond both quickly and effectively to potential challenges to its legitimacy as the leading force and the dominant power in Vietnam. The efficiency with which Vietnam managed to contain and put an end to the recent SARS epidemic is an example. As for the Internet, influential factions in the party and the state apparatus seemed intent on capitalizing on the economic benefits of the Internet, while allowing the Vietnamese people a small financial share. At the same time, the fulfillment of the expectations for the Internet was subject to the changing objectives of competing power bases within the party and the state apparatus. Would hard-liners be capable of neutralizing the potential political threat of the Internet along the lines of 'bread and circuses', i.e., food and entertainment? Alternatively, could gradual increases in social and economic opportunities for the Vietnamese people, a 'peaceful evolution', eventually undermine the power of the party? This chapter intends to answer those questions by addressing the politics of economics, by providing some insight into the VCP's internal power game and by discussing three time periods of the Internet era in Vietnam. 'Bread and circuses': the politics of economics The proponents of neo-liberalism, who believe in the invisible hand of the free markets, often are only too willing to see politics and economic policy as being mutually exclusive. Certainly, they would agree that a flourishing economy helps those in political power. They even may argue that economic development will inevitably lead to democracy. Still, in their view, political interference with economics must eventually lead to economic disaster. In short, economics prevail over politics. The Vietnamese reality, however, has had a stubborn tendency of non-compliance with neo-liberal theoretical constructions. Would the Internet change this tendency? In Vietnam, the importance of the politics of economics has long been understood by the VCP. In the 1980s, after years of failed agricultural policies, resulting in food shortages, the party realized that increasing poverty would cause people to question its legitimacy as the leading force in Vietnam. In 1986, the Sixth National Congress of the VCP introduced the concept of doi moi, or 'renovation'. Doi moi formally endorsed economic reforms that had been allowed to take place already for several years. One consequence of doi moi has been that the Vietnamese Diaspora, a transnational community consisting of people in the US, France, Canada, Australia, Germany, the UK and the formerly communist countries in eastern Europe, was considered part of the Vietnamese nation by the party. Aware of the economic potential of Vietnamese people living overseas, the party has been encouraging them to contribute to the economic development of the country. Although the concept of a Vietnamese Diaspora suggests otherwise, far from being united, the overseas Vietnamese community has been divided along political and generation lines. The economic reforms turned Vietnam into the world's second largest rice exporter and provided its 'bread'. However, the state maintains control over the distribution and export of rice. This political interference supposedly is intended to protect farmers from the price fluctuations of the world market. In Vietnam, however, the political economy of control is usually aimed at securing power by obtaining handsome profits for state-owned companies and at using price controls to neutralize potential sources of political unrest in the larger urban areas. Key to the success of the control policies has been stripping development of political content and meaning. Resolution 49/CP (1993) on the development of an information technology sector serves as an example. The resolution focused on the economics of information technology. This emphasis was confirmed by Directive No.58 (2000) on 'accelerating the use and development of information technology for the cause of industrialization [and] modernization' (VCP 2000). In 2003, in the context of this directive, Vietnam has started including Internet developments in its 'Ten Year Socio-Economic Development Strategy'. When the Internet was introduced, an important question was whether proponents of a political economy of control, aimed at obtaining economic benefits from an information technology sector, would prevail over hard-liners concerned with threats to their power base. The expected increases in Internet-generated information flows and telecommunication traffic would be of particular interest in that context. A parallel development would take place concerning the mass media when the issue of satellite television was under discussion in the 1990s. The same questions could have been asked. Would agreement be reached within the party and the state apparatus about how to reap the economic benefits while controlling the distribution of information, allowing people to satisfy their demand for information and to make a little money on the side? More interestingly, would the state apparatus be able to use price controls to neutralize the potential political threat of the Internet? In short, would an internally divided party and state apparatus be capable of turning the Internet into the 'circus' to accompany the 'bread'? In the early 1990s, they seemed to be in a strong enough political position to do so. The importance of being in charge In Vietnam, as is typical for communist regimes, policy is usually the outcome of a struggle between powerful factions in the party. Decision-making on Internet policy in Vietnam has not been different. Therefore, in order to understand the Internet developments in Vietnam, an insight into the power structure of the VCP is helpful. National congresses are often one of the few occasions for foreigners to glimpse the power structure of communist regimes. The national congresses in Vietnam are no exception to that rule. Despite the importance attributed to the national congresses by the VCP, however, they tend to pass unnoticed by the general public. They certainly have not led to the outbursts of flag-waving and jubilation which accompanied every Vietnamese victory in the 1998 Tiger Cup football tournament. The struggle by the party to retain its legitimacy may be the driving force behind economic reforms, but the underlying motives may differ throughout the party and the state apparatus. Similar incentives are likely to have prompted and defined Vietnam's rapid and very successful response to the SARS epidemic which hit the country in the first half of 2003. As was expected, the most recent national congress (2001) was another exercise in attempting to demonstrate the unity and socialist credentials of the VCP. The party's web site underlines these ideas by describing the Ninth National Congress of the VCP as 'one of wisdom, democracy, unity and renewal' (VCP 2001a). The word 'democracy' features relatively prominently and as a positive value in the proceedings of this national congress. However, that fact alone should not fool anyone into thinking that the party suddenly has seen the democratic light. In Vietnam, 'democracy' refers to carefully monitored 'democratic participation' by VCP members and a few selected non-party members in providing input to the various documents discussed during the national congress. This 'democratic' practice is not new and has been used during preparations for earlier national congresses. Despite the smoke screen of mentioning a 'democratic society' as a common goal, the proceedings of the national congress do not attempt to hide the fact that, despite internal divisions, the VCP is firmly in charge of affairs. The national congress confirmed the principle of 'democratic centralism', in other words, the party remained the spider in the web of political developments. By confirming the intention to 'ensure the leading role of the state economic sector', the national congress emphasized that the party also will continue to wield decisive influence in the economic domain (VCP 2001a). In the aftermath of the national congress, the party stated its appreciation for the Vietnamese Diaspora's contribution to economic development. Understandably, since in 2001, overseas Vietnamese contributed 11% of Vietnam's GDP. Members of the Vietnamese Diaspora urged the government to reduce the 'psychological, legal and political barriers' for 'intellectual contributions [by] the overseas Vietnamese' (Le Xuan Khoa 2002). The political motivation underlying the request was obvious and the party, therefore, did not comply. Partly for this reason, the Internet has so far done little to create local political influence for the Vietnamese Diaspora. Admittedly, establishing that the VCP is the dominant force in Vietnam does not require any genius. However, determining who pulls the strings is more difficult to divine, because of the different objectives which factions in the party and the state apparatus attempt to achieve. Again, the telecommunication and information technology developments and, more specifically, developments concerning the Internet were no exception. The government issues laws in the form of its decrees, but the Politburo and the Central Committee also play important roles through their directives and resolutions. In addition, relevant ministries have discretion in implementing decrees by issuing decisions to further their own objectives. Finally, the most recent decree on the 'Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services' -Decree No.55/2001/ND-CP of 23 August 2001- assigns roles to 'bodies affiliated to the government' and 'People's Committees of centrally-run provinces and cities' (VCP 2001b). The decree specifically refers to the Departments of Culture & Information, the provincial level representations of the Ministry of Culture & Information. Decree No.55 also illustrates the sometimes opaque nature of the legal situation concerning the Internet. The decree allows foreign minority stakes in Internet Access Providers (IXPs). Simultaneously, the Foreign Investment Law excludes telecommunication, e.g., the Internet from foreign investment. On the other hand, so-called business co-operation contracts (BCC) between foreign companies and Vietnamese state-owned enterprises are used to attract foreign investment and expertise without handing over control to foreign entities. Chronicling the development of the Internet in Vietnam and its influence on democratic developments, therefore, requires more than describing individual policies, legislation, regulations and events. More important is interpreting the significance of Internet-related developments in the wider political, economic and social context, as well as how these developments are linked. Which objectives did factions in the party and elements of the state apparatus define for the Internet? How did they plan to reconcile economic objectives with desires for political constraints on the freedom of speech? After all, communism's approach to human rights defines freedom of speech as the right of individuals to use that freedom in the interests of society alone. Had the VCP perhaps bitten off more than it could chew and would continued Internet growth eventually result in the party's demise and in a more democratic Vietnam? The Story of the Internet in Vietnam Opportunistic Jockeying for Position (1991 - 1997) The history of the Internet in Vietnam, arguably, started with the introduction of doi moi during the Sixth National Congress of the VCP in 1986. Initially, doi moi's economic reforms were accompanied by political and cultural openness aimed at the print media and generally known as coi mo, or 'openness'. Directive No.79 (1986) and Secretariat Directive No.15 (1987) allowed newspapers to write about shortcomings of the system and party officials, effectively supporting the official VCP campaign of self-criticism. However, this new freedom could only be exploited within the specific communist interpretation of human rights. In short, some room was created for constructive criticism, but only within the communist definition of the word 'constructive'. In 1990, Secretariat Directive No.63 was issued to increase VCP control over the state-owned print media and to reduce editorial autonomy. Apparently, socially conservative factions within the party had become concerned about differences in interpretation with the media of the word 'constructive'. The introduction of the Press Law (1990) signaled a mood shift within the party towards returning to information control, although the law also has been credited with giving journalists 'more resources to negotiate when confronted with obstructive officials' (Heng 1998: 44). The economic reforms, however, were not reversed. The party was exploring other avenues for new and increased revenues. Before long, information technology attracted attention and curiosity as a promising new economic sector. The following years witnessed an increasing awareness by some factions in the party and the state apparatus of the economic potential of information technology, particularly of the Internet. A simultaneous desire by other factions to retain control over information flows strongly influenced the nature and the pace of the early Internet developments. By the early 1990s, key players in the party and the state apparatus, who had championed the economic advantages of the Internet, appeared to have created a fairly favorable environment for Internet experiments, which focused on technical issues. This situation was probably more indicative of the prevailing factions in the party and the state apparatus at the time than the result of any deliberate VCP design. In particular, the economically reform-minded, but socially conservative Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet had been a supporter of information technology. While judging the initial official responses to these early Internet experiments, consideration has to be given to the fact that in 1991 few people anywhere had any idea of how the Internet would evolve. At that time, reactions within the party to Internet developments suggest that the Internet was perceived as a potentially lucrative aspect of the information technology sector, without the party being overly concerned about potential political threats from information available via experimental Internet connectivity. An indication, perhaps, that the Ministries of Culture & Information and of the Interior had conceded power, at least temporarily, to the telecommunications lobby. Another question concerning early Internet developments in Vietnam is whether the Internet pioneers were motivated by an explicit desire to promote the cause of democracy in Vietnam. Should the VCP, at these early stages, really have been concerned about a threat to their legitimacy and position of power by the 'democratic nature' of the Internet? Twelve years later, reconstructing the motives of the Internet pioneers is almost impossible. What can be said, however, is that the Internet has not yet led to an influential pro-democracy movement. Could the Vietnamese Internet pioneers have been driven primarily by their interest in a new and fascinating technology or a genuine desire for more opportunities for academic exchanges with foreign counterparts? What starts as a non-politically motivated initiative, of course, can acquire a political objective. In addition, the long-term impact on society would have been difficult to predict. However, those individuals involved in the early Internet experiments in Vietnam appear to have been more guided by academic curiosity and technological interest than by any clearly defined political goal. Simultaneously, is it unrealistic to assume that party members in the know were more interested in the potential economic gains of the Internet? The answers to these questions will remain elusive, but subsequent developments appear to confirm the interest in the economic potential of the Internet. In 1991, the first steps towards connecting to the Internet were undertaken by the Institute of Information Technology (IOIT), part of the National Center for Science & Technology Research in Hanoi. In collaboration with German and Dutch counterparts, the IOIT experimented with the Internet. One early initiative, an attempt at establishing e-mail based information exchanges, in conjunction with a German university, ran into technology and money problems. TOOLnet, the Dutch connection, eventually lost its funding in the Netherlands. In 1992, the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra became the provider of dial-up Internet access for the IOIT. E-mails could be sent to an IOIT Internet account at the ANU and messages would be forwarded to Vietnam in batches. In 1994, the connection process for the Internet had been improved. By now, however, some resistance, or perhaps reluctance, had been building up within the Ministry of the Interior and concerns about national security were raised. Therefore, experiments by the IOIT with full-scale, around-the-clock Internet access were not approved. In the same year, the IOIT and the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, the latter being responsible for Internet specific technology aspects of the Internet, agreed to register the .vn domain name. Parallel to the early Internet developments, Resolution CP/49 (VCP 1993) stressed the need for an information technology sector stating that 'guidelines and recommendations for government policies on development of an information technology infrastructure' had to be established. In addition, the resolution urged those involved to identify and develop information technology projects 'which should be undertaken by the government as a source of priority' (VCP 1993). The resolution showed that key people in the party and the state apparatus were aware of the potential economic benefits of information technology. However, the conspicuous absence of a reference to communication technology signals that free information exchanges may not have been the objective of all the people drafting and approving the resolution. In the first half of 1994, the Vietnam Academic Research & Educational Network (VAREnet) was launched with an e-mail sent by Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. Soon after its launch, VAREnet found itself at the receiving end of material originating within hawkish factions inside the Vietnamese Diaspora, including fierce anti-Communist propaganda. These counterproductive attacks from cyberspace appear to have been aimed at harassing the IOIT instead of genuinely attempting to create a local pro-democracy movement. As a result, the Vietnamese Internet pioneers were concerned about possible knee-jerk responses by party ideologues to the 'subversive' potential of the Internet. If anything, the overzealous activities by the then still very confrontation-oriented Vietnamese Diaspora may have reminded the party hawks of the potentially undesirable side-effects of Internet developments, as well as of the need for political economics of control. Over the following years, the network gradually expanded and by 1996 VAREnet contained a few hundred nodes in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Hue, amongst other cities. The network facilitated information exchanges by e-mail amongst academics and researchers, but did not offer any other Internet services. In the meantime, the more technically advanced NetNam, which provided access to downloaded Internet information, was created by the IOIT. In addition, NetNam operated a bulletin board system (BBS), a predecessor of the current chat rooms. NetNam also created a few online forums. However, due to the prohibitive dial-up costs, BBS users were mainly foreign NGOs, foreign corporations and expatriates, all based in Hanoi. In addition to VAREnet and NetNam, some organizations, such as the Ministry of Culture & Information and the Ministry of Trade, offered access to their Intranets and databases, CINET and VITRAnet, respectively. Gradually, Vietnamese people also started participating in the forums, but persistent rumors that party officials were monitoring the forums probably kept politics out of the discussions. The early involvement of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment and the participation of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in the VAREnet launch underlined the awareness within the state apparatus of the Internet experiments and encouraged the initiatives as part of developing an information technology sector. In order to properly understand the significance and extent of Internet developments in Vietnam in this period, consider the level of Internet awareness and usage in western countries in the early 1990s, in particular with respect to governmental awareness and usage. Such a comparison reveals the acute awareness of the VCP of the political and economic aspects of the Internet. Part of the reason is, of course, that in western countries early Internet developments were driven by the private sector and the governments mainly followed that lead. While these Internet developments were occurring, on another stage a political battle was being fought. The economic reformers were busy pressing for more free market economics, while ideologues in the party expressed concern for the weakening of VCP power. In the mid-1990s, despite economic reforms, political control of the economy had remained firmly with the party through the positions of its members in state-owned companies. Initially, political reforms had been part of doi moi as well. One reason for political reforms had been the alienation of the Vietnamese people from the VCP. Some level of openness in newspapers was tolerated. However, ideological hawks in the party became increasingly uncomfortable with the 'abuse', in their eyes, of that openness. Furthermore, external developments had provided an incentive to review the reforms started with doi moi. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies, as well as the consequences of the rise of the democracy movement in China, had emphasized to party hard-liners the potential results of too much political freedom. The hard-liners expressed a dislike, if not a fear, of a 'peaceful evolution'. In 1996, during the Eighth National Congress of the VCP, the battle had not been concluded yet, but in 1997 the anti-economic reform forces appeared to have achieved a victory with the replacement of, amongst others, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet by more economically conservative people. In 1997, the same year in which the VCP appeared to be reversing cultural and political openness, Decree No.21/CP was issued. This decree provided temporary legislation on the management, provision and use of Internet services. In May 1997, pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of Culture & Information issued Decision No.1110/BC, which stipulated that permits would be required to provide information on the Internet. This decision reflected a desire within that ministry to control the information flows on the Internet by providing a list of prohibitions on information access and provision, but also revealed a lack of understanding of the Internet. The decision did not address the issue of local web sites nor of dial-up access to web sites hosted by foreign ISPs. In preparation for Vietnam's official entry into cyberspace, 1997 witnessed a flurry of decisions as the factions in the party, the state apparatus and state-owned companies were readying themselves for the Internet. The Department General of Post and Telecommunications (DGPT), the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture & Information issued an official circular providing guidance on licensing for Internet services. In November, Decision No.109/1997/ND-CP on postal and telecommunication services was issued, as well as Decision No.679/1997/QD-TCBD mainly addressing the more technical issues of Internet services. Admittedly, this list of decrees and decisions does not make for interesting reading nor for scintillating conversation. However, the list reveals the key players in the early days of the Internet in Vietnam: the party, the Ministry of Culture & Information, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment and the DGPT. Within what was no longer a monolithic state, they were the key players defining the temporary legal framework and they clarified, through various legal documents, that the Internet was not supposed to be used to 'instigate against the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam' nor to 'distort the history, deny the achievements of the Revolution, hurt great men [or] national heroes' (VCP 1997). Instead, an agreement appeared to have been reached on an economic focus. Still, people were not supposed to 'leak out secrets of the Party and the State, secrets of military, security, economy, foreign policy (...) and other secrets regulated by law' (VCP 1997). Nevertheless, on the streets of Hanoi 'secret' information could be bought for a few dollars from 'information hawkers'. The ambiguous definition of what was allowed in terms of information provision indicated that the hard-liners, perhaps as a trade-off, had been allowed to use decrees, directives, resolutions and decisions to create some leeway for the party's interpretation on what constituted 'secret' information. Within the political economy of monopolies for state-owned companies created by the players in the legal arena, telecommunication companies were preparing to reap the anticipated financial benefits of the Internet. A subsidiary of the VNPT, Vietnam Data Communication (VDC), was the only IXP. Another subsidiary of the VNPT, Vietnam Internet Network (VNN), was assigned the management of the national Internet and the provision of connections to Internet gateways in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to ISPs. Simultaneously, VNN would operate as the main ISP, although other state-owned companies were also granted ISP licenses. Since all telecommunication services were provided by another VNPT subsidiary, Vietnam Telecommunication International (VTI), the state-owned companies were well positioned to collect the anticipated revenues of increased telecommunication traffic. A parallel with the situation concerning the production, selling, distribution and export of rice comes to mind. While some people were pondering whether the introduction of the Internet would kick-start, or at least prepare the grounds for, the long awaited move towards democracy in Vietnam, others were considering how to achieve less lofty goals. As has been shown above, by 1997, influential people in the party, the state apparatus and the state-owned companies had concluded that the Internet could become a lucrative source of revenue. Of course it would be melodramatic to state that people tumbled over each other in their rush to grab the Internet pot of gold, but some of them certainly used whatever political power they had to put themselves into the right position to obtain substantial economic benefits, while others added a measure of information control in the process. Finally, in December 1997, after all the jockeying for position ended, Vietnam connected to the Internet through two Internet gateways, one each in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. For all the talk about the democratic threat of the Internet, the prevailing powers within the VCP did not appear to be too concerned with that threat and allowed the entry into cyberspace for the more mundane reasons of financial gains and economic development. However, for proponents of the Internet's power to facilitate changes towards democracy, the entry into cyberspace was still a promising development. On the other hand, skeptics could not help seeing the reversal of the policy of openness and the connection of Vietnam to the Internet as an effort to maintain the political economy of control. At the end of 1997, the main question was whether the free market economics of the Internet, and the social and economic opportunities that could accompany it, would undermine the VCP's power and Vietnam's political economy of control. Making Money, but Losing Control? (1998 - 2001) When the party, the state apparatus and, above all, the state-owned companies had completed their preparations for Vietnam's entry into the information age, some were eagerly awaiting the economic benefits of the Internet. At the same time, however, some unease may have entered the minds of others: would the focus on the economics be sufficient to neutralize the potential political threat posed by the access to uncontrolled information? Would the Internet not spawn surreptitiously the dreaded 'peaceful evolution' towards democracy? The year 1998 was the first year in which Vietnamese people with enough funds were able to travel through cyberspace. In March 1998, there were about 3,000 Internet subscribers in Vietnam (Dang Ngoc Dinh 1999: 7). However, Internet cafés started sprouting like mushrooms and have continued to do so. At that early stage about 10,000 people were estimated to be using the Internet2. Most of the Internet outfits were basic, offering a chair and a computer, mocking the concept of a 'café'. However, others were actually fancy-looking cafés. In Ho Chi Minh City, small family owned hotels decided to acquire dial-up Internet connections in order to offer Internet connectivity to foreign guests. Internet cafés were mainly used by backpackers and other foreigners, but an increasing number of young Vietnamese could be found behind the screens of computers with connections to the Internet. However, a poll from around 1997, revealed that only about 20% of youngsters cared about democracy and social equality (Templer 1999: 342). Thus, instead of engaging in Internet activities because of a desire for democracy, the youngsters mainly emulated their counterparts in the rest of the world and used the Internet for checking e-mails and reading about fashion, popular music and other trendy topics. One of the recurring questions in the early days was whether, despite the party's political, economic and legal control over the Internet, the autonomous nature of the Internet would render the idea of information control an illusion. One option for circumventing information control was accessing the Internet through a dial-up connection to a foreign ISP. However, economic constraints prevented virtually all Vietnamese people from doing so, let alone whether anyone would have wanted to take the risk. In addition, the Internet, as a technology, was never going to impose a 'pro-democracy usage' on the Vietnamese. The question, therefore, was how society would take advantage of the Internet. Finally, the Vietnamese Diaspora was still too internally divided and confrontation-minded to capitalize effectively on the opportunities offered by the Internet. In 1998, four state-owned companies were officially licensed as ISPs and the Ministry of Culture & Information had licensed seven Information Content Providers (ICPs). Given the unusual nature of the legal distinction between IXPs, ISPs and ICPs, this appears to have been an attempt at influencing the local information available to Vietnamese users, if not directly at controlling the information flows. The latter was accomplished, to some extent, by blocking access from within Vietnam to specific web sites outside the country. Control over the Internet gateways by state-owned companies made blocking access relatively easy, if perhaps not entirely effective. Despite state monitoring and blocking activities, various organizations in the Vietnamese Diaspora claim that access to their web sites from inside Vietnam only became an issue from the year 2000 onwards. As a matter of fact, in the early Internet days the economic constraints resulting from the relatively high cost of access effectively reduced the need for very extensive political controls. In 1998, local dial-up access was virtually restricted to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Around the same time, the newspaper of the VCP, Nhan Dan, or 'The People', became the first periodical in Vietnam to post every issue on the Internet. Gradually, other publications and the VCP itself also launched web sites. By the end of 1998, the number of Internet subscribers had risen to around 20,000 (Dang Ngoc Dinh 1999: 7) and the number of users to about 60,000. Given the fairly successful introduction of the Internet, the economic potential was clear. So, what exactly was the democratic potential of the Internet at this early stage of its development? Moreover, how would 'democratic potential' have to be defined? Given the fact that local content was still limited and controlled, access to foreign anti-VCP web sites often blocked, the Vietnamese Diaspora still ineffective and the accessibility of the Internet constrained by the limited funds available to the people in Vietnam, the explicit potential has to be assessed as minimal. Even when considering the long-term process of increased social and economic opportunities outside the state to be part of the 'democratic potential', the potential of that process was still a theoretical possibility at best. Initially, the Internet mainly allowed for easier access outside the country to information on Vietnam, as well as allowing foreigners inside the country to use Internet cafés for their personal information and communication purposes. Although the number of Internet cafés in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and other cities gradually increased to a few thousand at the end of 2001, the subject of free information flows via the Internet remained a delicate issue. One indication was that officials were very reluctant, or completely unwilling, to discuss aspects of the Internet other than the technical and economic ones. They would cite a lack of specific knowledge once the more political aspects of the Internet became the topic of discussion. Usage of the Internet continued to increase and by the end of 1999 about 40,000 people had subscribed to the Internet (Dang Ngoc Dinh 1999: 7), which translated to 120,000 users. As has been mentioned, access to the Internet for actual and potential users suffered from economic constraints, as well as from technical obstacles such as software 'firewalls'. The latter were used by the state-owned company controlling the Internet gateways to block access to foreign web sites with 'undesirable' information. Despite this, people could access some web sites managed by organizations in the Vietnamese Diaspora, as well as send e-mails to other web sites or to Internet forums managed by factions in that same Diaspora, provided they had the relevant e-mail addresses. However, genuine participation in discussions would remain difficult. Two of the main pro-democracy forums were, and still are, DanChu.net -Dan Chu meaning 'democracy'- and Ykien.net. In addition to these two pro-democracy forums, the dissident Doan Viet Hoat launched the Viet Forum as a place for 'openly exchanging ideas and experiences among advocates and practitioners of democracy and human rights' (Vietnam Forum, www.vietforum.org). However, at present this web site does not contain any contributions beyond 2001. The Free Vietnam Alliance, a US-based gathering of pro-democracy and anti-VCP groups, the Vietnamese National Party and the Rally for Democracy and Pluralism were some of the other organizations that created their own web sites. In the first years of the Internet in Vietnam, the number of Internet web sites by competing Vietnamese Diaspora organizations grew significantly, but that did not necessarily increase their effectiveness. Around the same time, the Press Law was amended, which led to restrictions and even more centralized control over the media in Vietnam, with the Internet now specifically being included as a medium. In addition, the political situation was still unfavorable to virtual communities of people living in Vietnam. Whether the Internet would allow the Vietnamese Diaspora to exercise influence on developments towards democracy in Vietnam remained to be seen. Therefore, despite an increase in pro-democracy web sites outside Vietnam, it would have been optimistic in 2000 to state that the Internet had facilitated the emergence of a pro-democracy movement inside Vietnam. The number of users simply was too low, never mind that most youngsters continued to use the Internet for more mundane reasons. As it was, those youngsters were only transferring their increasingly strong desire for all things fashionable to the Internet. On the other hand, some young Vietnamese did start to explore the Internet for new social and economic opportunities for themselves. At the end of 2000, approximately 100,000 people had dial-up subscriptions to the Internet (ITU 2002: 19), which translated into an estimated 300,000 users. Given the increased telecommunication traffic, the growing number of Internet cafés and the proliferation of information technology companies, the economic story of the Internet, on the other hand, seemed to be more of a success. Almost four years after connecting to the Internet via its own gateways, Vietnam acquired something resembling a permanent legal framework for the Internet: a general law, which addressed the management, provision and use of the Internet (Decree No.55); implementation laws on fees, domain names, IP addresses and related issues (Decision No.84); Internet and telecommunication standards (Decision No.679); and on permits for information provision (Decision No.1110). However, that last implementation law was still based on the earlier Decree No.21 and would have to be replaced. Decree No.55 allowed private entities to become ISPs for the first time and soon after four private ISPs were licensed. The decree was assessed as relatively progressive and, at least nominally, gave individual users more rights (Probst 2001: 1). However, given the reputation of the state and the state apparatus upholding individual rights, the positive aspects of the decree could not be taken at face value. In addition, the decree now prohibited users in Vietnam from accessing web sites through dial-up connections with ISPs outside Vietnam. In June 2001, Decree No.31/2001/ND-CP was issued, which addressed the administrative violations in the area of culture and information. Nevertheless, the legal framework has been found wanting in the case of e-commerce. Regulation concerning e-commerce is lacking and the status of e-contracts is uncertain (Nguyen Thanh Hai 2002: 5). In addition, the national firewall, used to block access to web sites with ISPs outside Vietnam which are considered 'offensive or contrary to the government's perspective' (ITU 2002: 22), has hampered e-commerce development. Influential people in the party and the state apparatus have acknowledged the problems caused by the national firewall. As a result, a corporate park was created in Ho Chi Minh City, which offers opportunities for enterprises to operate beyond the national firewall. Furthermore, restrictions on information provision have been seen to be seriously limiting local content on the Internet, another prerequisite for further economic development. However, since information provision was still seen as more of a political than an economic issue no attempt was made to remove the restrictions. Despite having come to terms with the legal side of Internet affairs, all was not well. At the end of 2001, the number of Internet subscribers was estimated at around 165,000 (USAID 2001: ii), suggesting that close to 500,000 people were using the Internet. As a result, the more conservative factions in the party and the state apparatus seemed to be of two minds: the economic benefits of the Internet were appreciated, but a continued economic development of the information technology sector appeared to require more market liberalization, as well as more free flows of information. What was to be done next? Would it really be possible to reconcile the economic objectives of developing an information sector without having to relinquish political control over information? So far the Internet had led to only limited use for pro-democracy purposes. However, could it be that in the coming years the ghosts of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe would come to haunt the party leaders and the bureaucrats? Some factions in the Vietnamese Diaspora had moved from confrontation towards dialogue. Would they also manage to end their internal divisions, as well as to combine forces with a pro-democracy movement in Vietnam by means of the Internet? Alternatively, would the younger generation find ways to use the Internet as a means of creating opportunities outside the framework of the party and the state apparatus, thus initiating a 'peaceful evolution'? Control-hawks over Moneymakers? (2002 - 2003) In the first four years after 1997, the Internet did not spawn an influential pro-democracy movement inside Vietnam. As a matter of fact, political dissidents in Vietnam were usually to be found inside rather than outside the VCP. Nevertheless, based on responses to government criticism and pro-democracy postings on the Internet, the year 2002 may have signaled the emergence of such a movement. Events in the first months of 2002 stressed that the hard-liners within the VCP do not believe in the priority of individual human rights over the interests of society. On the contrary, the Ministry of Culture & Information underlined its concerns about the 'undesirable' use of the Internet by cracking down on cyber-dissidents who had posted political criticisms on the Internet. During the first months of 2002, a flurry of arrests of political dissidents occurred. In January, Nguyen Khac Toan was arrested in an Internet café in Hanoi. He was later convicted of espionage and sentenced to twelve years in prison. In February, Le Chi Quang was arrested in an Internet café for posting an essay titled 'Beware of Imperialist China' on the Internet criticizing the government's handling of a border issue with China. Later that year, he was found guilty of disseminating incorrect information and sentenced to four years in prison. In March, Pham Hong Son was arrested for posting a translated US embassy article, titled 'What is Democracy?', on the Internet. Prior to this article, he had published articles on democracy on the Internet forums Danchu.net and Ykien.net. In June 2003, he was sentenced to thirteen years in prison with the Rally for Democracy and Pluralism, a small Paris-based organization led by the political dissident Nguyen Gian Kie. Also in March 2002, Tran Van Khue, a spokesperson for the Democracy Activist Group, was arrested for posting an open letter on the border issue to Jiang Zemin on the Internet. In September 2002, Nguyen Vu Binh was arrested on charges of propaganda against the socialist state. During 2002 other people had been arrested on similar charges, indicating that the state had decided to limit freedom of expression on the Internet. In 2003, the crack down continued with the arrest, in March, of Nguyen Dan Que, one of Vietnam's best known dissidents, in an Internet café in Ho Chi Minh City. A secret Politburo Directive from around that time exposes an obsession within the Politburo for alleged organized international efforts at bringing about the overthrow of the Vietnamese government by means of a 'peaceful evolution'. Interestingly, all the arrested people have been charged on the basis of the 1999 Criminal Code, rather than the Internet laws. The arrests constituted a violation of the human rights of the cyber-dissidents, particularly their right to freedom of speech under the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights to which Vietnam is a party. Whether the arrests signaled the emergence of an Internet facilitated pro-democracy movement is, however, difficult to assess. Two of the arrested cyber-dissidents also were promoting a narrow nationalist cause and not only expressing a desire for more democracy. Nevertheless, a growing number of people appear to have started using the Internet to spread views on the need for democracy in Vietnam. Furthermore, Le Chi Quang and Pham Hong Son signed a petition to the National Assembly, presented in August 2002 by dissidents, asking for more democracy. Irrespective of whether 2002 witnessed the first signs of a nascent Internet based pro-democracy movement, hard-liners within the state apparatus in Vietnam did not appear to be willing to take any chances. To obtain a perspective of the Internet audience, it is important to know that, by the end of 2002, the number of users was estimated at 1.3 million. In a country with a population of almost 80 million people, these numbers are still relatively low. In July 2002, the DGPT introduced costs in the range from 2,400 - 10,800 Vietnamese Dong per hour (approx. 0.15 - 0.70 US dollars) for dial-up Internet access. As a result of the low rates, a key question was whether the now perhaps ineffective economic constraints would be complemented, or even substituted, by political controls. In response to the increased political use of the Internet, the Ministry of Culture & Information, has decided to further restrict the freedom to provide information via the Internet and, amongst other measures, to hold owners of Internet cafés responsible for the Internet activities of their clients. In August, Phan An Sa, deputy chief inspector at that ministry, expressed the intention to introduce stricter regulations concerning information access and provision via the Internet. Two months later, the Ministry of Culture & Information duly issued Decision No.27/2002/QD-BVHTT, which provides regulation on information provision by web sites. The decision stipulates that a permit is required before a web site can be established on the Internet and applies to Vietnamese and foreign agencies, organizations, enterprises and legal entities. Individuals are not included, but may not need to be given that cyber-dissidents have been arrested and convicted on the basis of the 1999 Criminal Code. The text of the decision emphasizes that the information provided 'shall not encourage the people to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or to undermine the great solidarity and unity of the entire people'. Web sites are also prohibited from disclosing 'State secrets' (VCP 2002). Once more the definitions of the prohibitions on information provision are clear in their intention and ambiguous in their meaning. Around the time of Decision No.27, access to satellite television was restricted to 'government officials, state media and foreigners' (HRW 2003). The estimates on the number of blocked web sites vary widely, from as low as around 50 to as high as 3,000 web sites. The blocked web sites generally have a political, religious or pornographic content. In 2002, the BBC World Service's Vietnam pages were also briefly blocked, but made accessible again after the UK exercised some diplomatic pressure. However, the authorities did close down the TTVNonline.com web site for violating the 1999 Press Law. Whether a web site is blocked has much to do with the clout of the owners of the web site. At the same time, the blocking of web sites is often carried out by ISPs, partly as a form of self-censorship and partly on 'advice' by the authorities. On the other hand, a third Internet gateway was opened in Danang. At the beginning of 2003, early developments suggested that the social conservatives in the state apparatus had decided to increase their control over Internet-based information flows. In April, an editorial in the Vietnamese army's newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, or 'The People's Army', lamented the ineffectiveness of the legal and technological controls on information accessible through the Internet. The paper complained that, as a result, 'material that [carries] reactionary and degenerate contents [was] circulated by reactionary organizations outside the country and by extremist and dissenting elements in the country' (Phuong Hieu 2003). Whether the increased control will be introduced at the expense of economic aspects of the Internet cannot be determined at present. What appeared to be clear is that the different factions in the party were having difficulties reconciling the economic goals for the Internet with the desire by some for political control of information. In the meantime, the VCP's ongoing struggle with its legitimacy led to a show trial of an alleged underworld boss and his 154 alleged accomplices, probably aimed at assuring the Vietnamese people that the party is serious about fighting corruption. Media coverage of the event was heavily controlled. For a while to come, continued control over the mainstream media may well overshadow prospects of alternative Internet-based information provision. At the Crossroads: Propaganda or Infotainment? Reading the story of the Internet in Vietnam from 1991 onwards, it appears as if the VCP's concern about its legitimacy as the leading force in Vietnam led to a 'pre-emptive strike'. However, the state is no longer a monolith. Therefore, the decision to embrace information technology as a potential economic growth sector appears to have been the outcome of struggle between factions within the party and the state apparatus. Broadly speaking, the telecommunication lobby appears to have been motivated by purely economic motives, while the social conservatives targeted indirect benefits of economic development, i.e., preserving the legitimacy of the party as the leading force in Vietnamese society. The latter group, represented by the Ministry of Culture & Information and the Ministry of Public Security (formerly the Ministry of the Interior), most likely was responsible for the information control aspects of decrees, directives and decisions. Nevertheless, both these factions appear to agree that political stability is necessary to achieve economic development. They may, however, disagree on what exactly constitutes political stability. Given the divisions within the VCP, the presence of factions with still different motivations is likely. However, their influence on Internet developments has been difficult to discern and assess from outside the party. Given the continued development of the Internet, the proponents of a purely economic focus appear to have prevailed. The development of Internet access costs serves as evidence. Initially, by setting high rates for Internet dial-up access, the state apparatus ensured that foreigners would provide a handsome profit through their Internet use. The rates also served as an economic constraint on access by Vietnamese people, avoiding a need for political controls. However, the rates have decreased dramatically over the past years, bringing Internet access within reach of a larger part of the population. The number of Internet cafés has increased hugely and ever more people are using the Internet for a variety of purposes. A 2002 government survey of Internet cafés suggests that the average customer is between 14 and 24 years of age and spends most of her time (70%) chatting. The fact that trials with VSAT access to the Internet have been approved is an indication that the telecommunication lobby may be having the upper hand in the Internet related decision-making process. The divisions within the party and the state apparatus concerning that development are best illustrated by the crackdown by the Ministry of Culture & Information on people posting criticism of the government and pro-democracy articles on the Internet, as well as on 'undesirable' use of the Internet. While the telecommunication lobby keeps lowering access rates and continuously introduces more advanced technology, including trials with VSAT based satellite connectivity, the socially conservative faction has become jittery. At present, the outcome of the struggle between these powerful factions within the party and the state apparatus cannot be predicted. A lot would seem to depend on for what purposes the people in Vietnam decide to use the Internet. It seems likely that, for a while at least, the hard-liners may be able to suppress the emergence of an Internet- based pro-democracy movement inside Vietnam to deny the Vietnamese Diaspora significant influence via the Internet. The internal divisions within that Diaspora have not helped, nor have its factions effectively used the Internet for their causes. Furthermore, the second generation overseas Vietnamese does not appear to approach Vietnam with a grudge originating in history. In another development, the Vietnamese Diaspora in the US has succeeded in persuading members of the US Congress to submit a bill which would make funds available for a project aimed at stopping the blockage of web sites and the persecution of Internet users in Vietnam (FVA 2003). The bill was introduced in April and almost immediately led to indignant reactions in a number of editorials in the Vietnamese army's newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan. Still, it may be more difficult to halt a 'peaceful evolution' of society. The Internet has created social and economic opportunities outside the framework of the party and the state apparatus, which may eventually undermine the VCP's power. The most important conclusion, therefore, is that ultimately people will decide upon the role of the Internet in society, independent of the capabilities of the Internet and irrespective of the democratic powers attributed to the network. The VCP's survival instincts, as well its increased ability to respond to potential challenges to its legitimacy such as, for example, the SARS epidemic, may have given it the edge so far over the cyber-dissidents and any prospective Internet-based pro-democracy movement. The party has understood the need for economic success, has identified the Internet as a promising contributor to that success and also has made sure to reap the financial benefits. Simultaneously, enterprising Vietnamese people have focused attention on obtaining their economic share of the modest Internet-boom. In addition, the vast majority of the users of the Internet have realized that the network is very useful for keeping up with fashion, music and international sports. However, it is possible that a measure of fear of the authorities has influenced the way people use the Internet. Despite the fact that more people gradually are using the Internet to increase their social and economic opportunities outside the party and the state apparatus, so far the Internet has been rendered fairly harmless because of its ability to give access to 'pernicious' western entertainment which has provided an alternative to 'virtuous' communist propaganda. Bread and circuses, food and entertainment, rice and the Internet. The irony of it all. End notes 1 In July 2003 the average hourly rate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City was 3,000 Vietnamese Dong, or about 0.20 US dollar. However, some Internet cafes were advertising with rates of 2,000 Vietnamese Dong per hour, or about 0.13 US dollar. The hourly rates in smaller towns with limited competition was estimated to be between 4,000 to 6,000 Vietnamese Dong, or 0.25 to 0.39 US dollar. 2 On average, publications on the history of the Internet in Vietnam tended to multiply the number of subscribers by three to arrive at the estimated total number of Internet users. However, in recent years that factor has gradually become less accurate and a factor four to five seems to be more correct. 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